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Abstract: 
 
In this paper I investigate whether there is a systematic difference between 
conventional banks and participation banks in terms of their response to monetary policy 
shocks. For this purpose I look at the quarterly loan growth of commercial banks and 
participation banks in Turkish banking sector and see whether the lending channel of 
monetary policy differs depending on bank type. At the same time I control for some bank 
specific variables, namely the log of real assets, the ratio of liquid assets to total assets and 
the ratio of equity to total assets. I find that participation banks show larger reaction to 
monetary policy. In terms of bank specific variables, banks with higher liquidity ratio tend to 
have higher loan growth whereas, banks with larger asset size have smaller loan growth. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The lending channel of monetary policy has been a topic of research for 
many economists and policymakers. The general wisdom is that when the central 
bank adopts a monetary policy tightening by raising the interest rates, this leads to a 
rise in the funding costs of banks and therefore a reduction in loan growth. The 
studies reveal that lending channel of monetary policy works for many economis but 
the reaction of banks to changes in monetary policy is not uniform and depends on 
various factors. In this regard bank fundamentals have a significant impact on the 
lending channel of monetary policy. Peek and Rosengren (1995) find that bank 
capitalization measured by the ratio of capital to total assets, affects the reaction of 
banks to monetary policy. Kishan and Opiela (2000) investigate lending channel of 
monetary policy for U.S. banks from 1980 to 1995 and they find that small banks 
and undercapitalized banks are more affected by monetary policy. Kashyap and 
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Stein (2000) also analyze the monetary transmission mechanism for U.S. banks and 
find that the lending channel of monetary policy has larger impact on banks with 
lower ratios of cash and securities to assets. 
The studies also reveal that bank ownership and the level of competition in 
the market also affect the lending channel of monetary policy. Macit (2012) studies 
the Turkish banking sector from 2006 to 2010 and investigates whether the 
ownership structure of banks affects their response to monetary policy. He finds that 
public banks show the smallest reaction to monetary policy, whereas foreign banks 
are the most responsive banks.2 Bhaumik, Dang and Kutan (2011) analyze the 
implications of bank ownership for lending channel of monetary policy for Indian 
banking sector. They find that bank ownership has significant impact on the 
reactions of banks to monetary policy. Olivero, Li and Jeon (2011) investigate the 
impact of level of competition in banking sector on the lending channel of monetary 
policy by looking at the data for commercial banks in 10 Asian and 10 Latin 
American countries from 1996 to 2006. They find that the lending channel of 
monetary policy is weakened as the level of competition increases. 
The contribution of this paper to existing literature is that it investigates the 
lending channel of monetary policy for Turkish banking sector and analyze whether 
banks' reactions to monetary policy change depending on their type. In particular, I 
investigate whether there is a systematic difference in the response of commercial 
banks and participation banks to changes in monetary policy. In Turkish banking 
sector there are three types of banks, namely commercial banks, participation banks, 
and investment and development banks.3 Table 1 shows the number of banks and 
total asset size for each type by the end of the third quarter of 2011. In Turkish 
banking sector commercial banks significantly dominate the sector and they hold 
about 92.5% of the total assets in Turkish banking sector. Participation banks 
operate according to Islamic rules in their lending and deposit collection activities 
and they own about 4.4% of total assets in the sector. As opposed to commercial 
banks they do not promise a fixed interest payment to their depositors. Instead, the 
funds that are collected from depositors are utilized in trade and industry and the 
profit that is obtained from the lending pool is shared by the depositors. The name 
"participation banks" also stems from the fact that the depositors participate in profit 
or loss that results from the activities of the bank. As can be seen in Figure 1 and 
Figure 2, even though these banks occupy a small place in the sector, their rapid 
growth rate implies an important future potential for these banks. 
 
                                               
2 Aydin and Igan (2010), Catik and Karacuka (2011), and Alper, Hulagu and Keles (2012) are some 
other examples who study the lending channel of monetary policy for Turkish banking sector. 
3 I do not take into account investment and development banks when looking at whether the lending 
channel of monetary policy changes depending on bank type. The reason is that as opposed to 
commercial banks and participation banks these banks are not entitled to collect deposits and this might 
create a significant difference. 
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Figure 1. The Growth Rate of Assets For Different Bank Types 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Share of Participation Banks in Terms of Assets, Loans, and Deposits 
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Table 1. Number of Banks and Total Asset Size (Million TL) 
  Bank Types   # Banks   Total Asset Size   % Share  
 Commercial 
Banks  
 30   1121032   92.5%  
 Participation 
Banks  
 4   53550   4.4%  
 Investment and 
Development 
Banks  
 13   37898   3.1%  
 TOTAL   47   1212480   100.0%  
 
In order to investigate whether there is a difference in the reactions of 
commercial banks and participation banks to changes in monetary policy I look at 
the quarterly loan growth of these banks and see how it is affected from a change in 
monetary policy instrument. At the same time I control for some bank specific 
variables, namely the log of real assets, the ratio of equity to total assets, and the 
ratio of liquid assets to total assets. I find that participation banks are more 
responsive compared to commercial banks in terms of lending channel of monetary 
policy. The results also reveal that in general, banks that have higher ratios of liquid 
assets to total assets tend to have higher loan growth whereas banks with larger asset 
size are more likely to have lower loan growth. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a description 
of the data and empirical model. Section 3 presents the estimation results and policy 
implications. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Data and Empirical Model 
 
2.1 Full Sample Level 
The data that is used in the paper is a quarterly data that cover the period 
from 2006Q1 to 2010Q4.4 The data for commercial banks which include quarterly 
loan growth, the log of real assets, the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, and the 
ratio of equity to total assets is calculated from unconsolidated balance sheets of 
banks which are obtained from Banks Association of Turkey database. Participation 
Banks Association of Turkey database is the data source for participation banks. 
Table 2 gives a brief summary of bank specific variables used in the model. 
The results reveal that in general commercial banks are much more liquid than 
participation banks measured by the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. This is in 
fact related with the nature of participation banks. These banks, as they operate 
according to Islamic rules, are not allowed to hold interest-bearing securities. 
                                               
4 The data for commercial banks include the largest 15 commercial banks which account for more than 
97% of total loans for commercial banks. 
51 
Who Responds More to Monetary Policy? 
Conventional Banks or Participation Banks 
 
Therefore, their alternatives in terms of investing in liquid assets are very limited 
and they keep a very large portion of their assets in the form of loans. 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics For Bank Specific Variables 
  Variables   Total   Commercial   Participation  
 Real Assets        
 Mean   207910.3   253615.5   36515.7  
 Standard 
Deviation  
 207911.9   211629.6   13805.5  
        
 Liquidity        
 Mean   28.05   30.99   17.03  
 Standard 
Deviation  
 10.80   10.11   4.17  
        
 Equity        
 Mean   11.81   11.71   12.20  
 Standard 
Deviation  
 2.64   2.71   2.31  
        
 Loan Growth        
 Mean   7.10   6.77   8.36  
 Standard 
Deviation  
 7.26   7.47   6.33  
 
 
There does not exist a big difference between commercial banks and 
participation banks in terms of their capitalization. Both types of banks are well-
capitalized. In terms of loan growth, participation banks have higher quarterly loan 
growth on average. This is actually consistent with the purpose of these banks as 
they channelize a very large portion of the funds they collect to lending. 
In terms of the choice of monetary policy instrument, the literature generally 
uses the target interbank rate by the central bank as the monetary policy instrument. 
For instance, in U.S. case Kashyap and Stein (1995) use the federal funds rate as the 
monetary policy instrument. Gambacorta (2005) uses the refinancing rate of 
European Central Bank for a study related with European banking sector. In this 
paper, I use the overnight lending rate by the Central Bank of Turkey as the 
monetary policy instrument. The reason is that this rate significantly affects the 
interbank rate and therefore by influencing the funding costs of banks has an impact 
on loan supply of banks. 
 
2.2 Empirical Model 
The reduced form equation that is estimated using fixed effects estimation 
can be written as follows: 
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ittit
'
ittittiit GDPBSVPDMPICDMPIloan    11211=
    (1) 
 
where itloan  represents the quarterly loan growth of bank i  at time t  and 
1 tMPI  refers to the change in monetary policy instrument at time t . The 
monetary policy instrument is put in the model with a lag as any change in monetary 
policy will be more likely to affect the loan growth of banks only next quarter. CD  
and PD  are dummy variables representing commercial banks and participation 
banks respectively. 1itBSV  is a vector of bank specific variables for bank i  at time 
1t . It includes the log of real assets ( 1itLRA ), the ratio of liquid assets to total 
assets ( 1itLIQ ), and the ratio of equity to total assets ( 1itETA ). Again following 
Bhaumik, Dang and Kutan (2011) bank specific variables are put in the model with 
a lag. The growth rate of GDP  is included as a macroeconomic control variable and 
i  stands for unobserveable bank specific fixed effects. 
The model is estimated using fixed effects estimation method. The other 
commonly used estimation technique for panel data models is random effects 
estimation. The difference between the two estimation techniques is that fixed 
effects estimation treats the bank specific unobserveable effects i  as fixed, 
whereas the random effects model treats them as random. However, in order to be 
able to obtain consistent estimators in random effects estimation one should assume 
that s
'
i  and the other independent variables in the model are not dependent. 
Hausman (1978) provides a test statistics in order to test whether s
'
i  and other 
explanatory variables are independent. The results reveal that they are not 
indepedent and fixed effects estimators should be preferred to random effects 
estimators in order to obtain consistent estimators. 
 
 
3.  Estimation Results and Policy Implications 
 
3.1 Estimation Results 
Estimation results are given in Table 3. The bank specific fixed effects are 
not reported here but the F-statistics related with the joint significance of these 
effects is significant at 1% level. The F-statistics for the overall significance of the 
model is reasonably high and the R-squared of the regression is 0.34. 
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Table 3. Estimation Results 
 
  Coefficients   Loan Growth  
 LRA   -11.1865

  
   (1.6735)  
 ETA   0.0371  
   (0.2022)  
 LIQ   0.1513

  
   (0.0555)  
 GDP   0.4606

  
   (0.0515)  
 MPI*CD   -0.7870    
   (0.2035)  
 MPI*PD   -1.1374    
   (0.3735)  
 F-statistics   30.32  
 Prob>F   0.0000  
 R-squared   0.3388  
 F-statistics (all 
0)=i   
 4.48  
 Prob>F   0.0000  
 # observations   380  
Notes:  In terms of the statistical significance of the coefficient estimates 

  denotes the significance at 
10% level, 

  denotes significance at the 5% level, and 

  denotes significance at the 1% level. 
The numbers in paranthesis are the respective standard errors. 
 
In terms of bank specific variables the results show that asset size and the 
ratio of liquid assets to total assets are significant variables. It is seen that smaller 
banks tend to have higher loan growth. This is consistent with the findings of Kishan 
and Opiela (2000) who investigate the response of U.S. bank to monetary policy and 
find that small banks are more responsive to changes in monetary policy. In terms of 
liquidity, more liquid banks are likely to have higher loan growth. Kashyap and 
Stein (2000) also find that U.S. banks that have lower ratio of cash and securities to 
total assets tend to be more affected by the lending channel of monetary policy. The 
ratio of equity to total assets does not seem to be a significant bank specific 
characteristic that affects loan growth. 
The response of commercial banks and participation banks to lending 
channel of monetary policy is measured by the change in monetary policy 
instrument that interacts with the respective dummy variables for both types of 
banks. The coefficients of CDMPI   and PDMPI   are both negative 
implying that an increase in overnight lending rate, which is the monetary policy 
instrument here, leads to a decline in loan growth of both commercial banks and 
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participation banks. That is, the lending channel of monetary policy works for 
Turkish banking sector. However, the results reveal that the reactions of commercial 
banks and participation banks are not the same. To be more specific, for commercial 
banks one percent increase in overnight lending rate of central bank is expected to 
generate 0.79 percent decline in quarterly loan growth. On the other hand, 
participation banks show larger reaction to the lending channel of monetary policy. 
Numerically, one percent increase in overnight lending rate is expected to reduce the 
quarterly loan growth of participation banks by 1.14 percent. 
 
3.2 Policy Implications 
One can derive three important policy implications related with Turkish 
banking sector from the results obtained in this paper. First of all, for a combined 
sample of commercial banks and participation banks bank specific variables affect 
the lending channel of monetary policy. It is found that small banks and banks with 
higher ratios of liquid assets to total assets tend to have higher loan growth. In terms 
of asset size this shows us that for Turkish banks, small banks are more aggresive in 
terms of their loan growth. Another bank specific variable that affects bank lending 
is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. The results show that banks that are more 
liquid are likely to have higher loan growth. This result is not surprising, as one 
could expect more liquid banks to respond less to monetary policy as they have 
more space to move in case of a monetary tightening. 
Secondly, the results show that the lending channel of monetary policy 
works for Turkish economy. The coefficients for the change in monetary policy 
instrument, which is interacted with dummy variables for commmercial banks and 
participation banks, are both negative. Therefore, when the Central Bank of Turkey 
wants to affect the total demand in the economy via the lending channel, banks show 
considerable reaction to changes in monetary policy instrument. 
Thirdly, the results provide evidence that there is a difference in the 
reactions of commercial banks and participation banks to the lending channel of 
monetary policy. It is found that participation banks are more responsive to 
monetary policy shocks in terms of their loan growth. One can conjecture that this 
may be due to the operating nature of these banks. Participation banks operated 
according to Islamic rules and they are basically doing interest-free banking. 
Therefore, in comparison to commercial banks they are more restricted in terms of 
their funding alternatives. For instance, participation banks cannot borrow in the 
form of syndicated loans which is an important source of external finance for 
Turkish banks. So limitation in funding alternatives could make participation banks 
more responsive to monetary policy shocks in terms of their lending. 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
Who Responds More to Monetary Policy? 
Conventional Banks or Participation Banks 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper I investigate the lending channel of monetary policy for 
Turkish banking sector for the period from 2006 to 2010 and analyze whether banks' 
reactions change according to their type. In particular, I look at whether commercial 
banks and participation banks respond differently to changes in monetary policy 
instrument. At the same time I control for some bank fundamentals that are assumed 
to affect bank lending. 
In terms of bank specific variables, the results reveal that asset size and 
liquidity affect bank lending. In particular, small banks and banks that have higher 
ratio of liquid assets to total assets tend to have higher loan growth. This result is 
consistent with the other studies in the literature that are carried out for U.S. banking 
sector and other economies. 
The results also reveal that lending channel of monetary policy works for 
Turkish economy for a combined sample of commercial banks and participation 
banks. That is, an increase in overnight lending rate by the central bank generates a 
reasonable decline in loan growth of Turkish banks. However, there are important 
differences in the responses of commercial banks and participation banks. On 
average, participation banks tend to be more responsive to monetary policy shocks, 
whereas commercial banks are less influenced from the lending channel of monetary 
policy. One could attribute this difference to the operating nature of participation 
banks which operate according to Islamic rules and therefore, have limited funding 
opportunities compared to commercial banks. 
 
 
 
References 
 
1. Alper, K., Hulagu, T., Keles, G., (2012). "An Empirical Study on Liquidity and Bank 
Lending", Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey Working Paper, No.4 
2. Aydin, B., Igan, D., (2010). "Bank Lending in Turkey: Effects of Monetary and Fiscal 
Policies", IMF Working Paper, No.233. 
3. Bhaumik, S.K., Dang, V., Kutan, A.M., (2011). "Implications of Bank Ownership For 
the Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission: Evidence From India", Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 35, 2418-2428. 
4. Catik, A.N., Karacuka, M., (2011). "The Bank Lending Channel in Turkey: Has It 
Changed After the Low Inflation Regime", DICE Discussion Paper, No.32. 
5. Gambacorta, L., (2005). "Inside the Bank Lending Channel", European Economic 
Review, 49, 1737-1759. 
6. Hausman, J.A., (1978). "Specification Test in Econometrics", Econometrica, 46, 1251-
1271. 
7. Kashyap, A.K., Stein, J.C., (1995). "The Impact of Monetary Policy on Bank Balance 
Sheets", Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 42, 151-195. 
8. Kashyap, A.K., Stein, J.C., (2000). "What Do a Million Observations on Banks Say 
About the Transmission of Monetary Policy", American Economic Review, 90, 407-428. 
56 
 
European Research Studies,  Volume XV, Issue (2), 2012 
 
9. Kishan, R.P., Opiela, T.P., (2000). "Banks Size, Bank Capital and Bank Lending 
Channel", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 32, 121-141. 
10. Macit, F., (2012). "Does Bank Ownership Affect the Credit Channel of Monetary 
Policy", Suleyman Sah University, Working Paper. 
11. Olivero, M.P., Li, Y., Jeon, B.N., (2011). "Competition in Banking and the Lending 
Channel: Evidence From Bank Level Data in Asia and Latin America", Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 35, 560-571. 
12. Peek, J., Rosengren, E., (1995). "Bank Regulation and the Credit Crunch", Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 19, 679-692.  
13. Thalassinos, E., (2007), “Trade Regionalization, Exchange Rate Policies and EU-US 
Economic Cooperation”, Volume X, Issue 1-2, pp. 111-118. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
